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Dr. Haas sums up his basic approach as follows: "I propose that the
United States adopt a foreign policy based on the notion of regulation."
That theme is one of several things that makes this an important book. The
theme and the title go right to the heart of the challenge for United States
foreign policy in the post cold war world. As important, they do it in a
way that is easy to understand, thereby enhancing the possibility that larger
segments of the American public will rise to the challenge. This is not a
heavy treatise built on a foundation of jargon making it accessible only to
specialists and international relations of international law. Instead, it is
brisk, direct, and makes effective use of the regulation, sheriff, and posse
metaphors to frame the important questions.
Appropriate political structures, in Dr. Haas' view, are necessary for
an effective American foreign policy and for a peaceful world. Political
structures represent a kind of "regulation" in the international arena. The
cold war provided a bi-polar political structure that offered a place for
almost all nation states and provided a compass for American foreign
policy. The end of the cold war, with nearly 200 nation states adrift, made
American foreign policy directionless. The absence of a political
framework for small or less powerful countries increases the risk of
anarchy. The absence of a coherent foreign policy erodes the basis for the
necessary political support for any kind of international engagement by the
United States.
"The reluctant sheriff" explains that all of the post cold war empirical
evidence suggests that the United States must exercise leadership. In order
for this to happen, there must be an intellectual framework within the
United States from which coherent foreign policy directions can be
extracted, and there must be a reasonable political consensus supporting
international engagement by the United States.
Coherence in either the intellectual framework or the actual foreign
policy requires simple and understandable goals. Dr. Haas suggests
stability as the central goal of a post cold war American foreign policy.
Pursuit of this goal will, on occasion, justify United States intervention,
which sometimes will take the form of military intervention, which
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sometimes will take the form of military intervention. When this is
appropriate, the United States will act in the role of a sheriff.
The posse metaphor signifies that while the United States is the
preeminent military power, it is not sufficiently powerful to act effectively
alone. It needs participation by other states to support any military
intervention. Thus, the United States as sheriff can act effectively only by
persuading others to join its "posse."
The stability goal means that use of force in the international arena
must be opposed.
The implications of Dr. Haas' second central goal, free trade, is less
clear. Whether major threats to free trade would justify military
intervention is doubtful. Presumably the means used to promote free trade
would range up to, but not beyond, economic sanctions. There also, the
United States could play the role of sheriff but could not act effectively
alone and must enlist others in its posse.
Dr. Haas erroneously distinguishes sheriffs from police officers,
asserting that police officers, but not sheriffs, need explicit legal authority
to perform their law enforcement functions. On the contrary, the duty of a
sheriff in Anglo-American law traditionally was to execute writs (specific
orders in specific cases) issued by courts. A sheriff acting without such
judicial authority would be no different from an ordinary citizen in his legal
capacity and would be subject to civil liability for conversion of property,
trespass, battery, and false imprisonment.
In one respect, that is a mere lawyer's quibble over a metaphor. The
metaphor provides firm support for Dr. Haas' essential point, which relates
to the role of the posse and the sheriffs relationship with it. In the wild
west, the sheriffs legal authority from a writ issued by a court, typically
an arrest warrant, did him little good as a practical matter. In order to
effectuate his authority, he needed sufficient physical force to overcome the
resistance of the subject of the writ. The posse provided that coercive
supplement to the sheriff. As a theoretical matter, all citizens were
obligated to obey the sheriff's command to join a posse. In fact, however,
whether the sheriff could form a posse was a political matter and depended
on persuasion and collective interest rather than the law.
This is exactly the relationship between international law and peace
enforcement in the post cold war world. In theory, and under international
law, the United States' role as organizer and leader of peach enforcement
efforts depends on legal authority - a United Nations ("UN") Security
Council resolution, or the privilege of self defense under customary
international law and article 52 of the United Nations charter. But the
existence of these sources of legal authority are hardly sufficient, they do
little more than the arrest warrant did for the sheriff in the wild west.
What really matters is the political practicability of organizing a posse, and
that depends on collective self-interest and on persuasion at the political
level.
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But to stop there understates the role of international law, just like Dr.
Haas' book understates the role of the writ for the wild west sheriff.
The sheriff in the wild west faced a law suit and damages if he acted
and organized a posse without a writ. But that was not the important point.
What is important about the antecedent of the metaphor is that the sheriff
would not be able to organize a posse as a political matter without a writ.
He had no legitimacy without a writ. A posse, whether or not organized
by the sheriff, was a lynch mob unless there was a writ authorizing its
formation and activity. Lynch mobs of course formed from time to time,
but the sheriff had stronger rhetorical leverage and thus was more
persuasive when he could say to potential posse members, "Do your duty.
We must enforce the law and order" rather than saying, "Join my lynch
mob." Similarly, in the post cold war international arena unilateral action
occurs, and to be sure, it is not subject to the obrobrium attached to the
term "lynch mob." Nevertheless, sources of legitimacy found in
international law play a major role in the rhetoric leading up to the modern
form of a posse. The United States had a stronger moral position and thus
could be more persuasive in desert storm because it had Security Council
resolutions. Similarly, in Bosnia, the United States organized North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Implementation Force was more practicable
because there was a source of legitimacy both in peace keeping UN
Security Council resolutions and in the privilege of self-defense because the
signatories of the Dayton Accords. Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia had
requested NATO assistance, thereby triggering the privilege of self-defense
under Article 52 and customary international law.
The intellectual challenge for students of international law and
international relations, and the policy challenge is to work out the
relationship between the United States role as sheriff and the appropriate
metaphor for the writ in the post cold war world. As Dr. Haas points out,
the mechanisms for obtaining international writs, the UN Security Council
process especially, is convoluted. Its performance in Bosnia was
disgraceful.
But there may be a richer array of choices than Dr. Haas suggests.
There may be intermediate possibilities between waiting for a UN Security
Council resolution sufficiently explicit to represent a writ authorizing
military action, and unilateral action by the United States without any basis
of authority in international law. One obvious possibility is commitments
by regional authorities. More needs to be done to understand why NATO
succeeded where the UN failed in Bosnia. Even if regional possibilities for
issuing post cold war writs can be worked out, that source of authority
must be reconciled with the UN Security Council's authority under Article
53. Controversy has swelled for years around the issue whether entire
Security Council authority is necessary for regional action (most people
think not) and whether the absence of post action authority negates the
legitimacy of continued regional action.
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The need for legitimacy is just as great with respect to the posse
engaged in application of economic sanctions as with one engaged in
military intervention. The recent uproar over application of Helms-Burton
and the Iran Sanctions Act to punish those violating the United States'
economic sanctions against Cuba and Iran are examples. The rest of the
world does not consider extra territorial application of United States' law to
be legitimate in the absence of some kind of imprimatur under international
law (and maybe even with such an imprimatur).
The most immediate problem is for the United States to decide what it
will do if the World Trade Organization ("WTO") decides' adversely to it
in Helms-Burton or Iran Sanctions Act cases. There will be a concrete
decision under international law. There will be not question of the United
States' obligation to comply with it. In the long run, compliance will
enhance the stature of the WTO institutions. In the long run stronger WTO
institutions will enhance free trade. But the United States. has, in the
international trade arena as in the military arena, sufficient strength to act
unilaterally. It is possible for it to ignore the "writ", though in this case as
the target of the posse rather than its leader.
Second, there should be a clearer understanding of the role of
international law as a mechanism for crystallizing political positions
through rhetoric.
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